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WHAT CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS CAN TEACH US
ABOUT THE STRUCTURE OF SUBCHAPTER C
By Glenn E. Coven
Glenn E. Coven is the Godwin Professor of Law at
the College of William and Mary School of Law.
Coven argues that the rules extending nonrecognition treabnent to the incorporation of property never
have been properly integrated with the double taxation of corporations. As a result, the duplicate burden
or benefit is applied retroactively. That defect, Coven
believes, has been long overlooked, but now that it has
been exploited by one popular version of the loss
replicating corporate tax shelter, it must be addressed.
The remedy applied by Congress to the tax shelter in
section 358(h) is insufficient, does not operate correctly
and undermines the integrity of the code, he says.
This article proposes a more comprehensive solution that would improve the code by eliminating both
the benefits and the burdens of the retroactive double
tax through dual basis adjusbnents similar to those
used in partnership taxation. The article was prepared
before the adoption of section 362(e)(2). That provision, however, merely underscores the need for the
solution suggested here, Coven concludes.
The author would like to thank Jeffrey Kwall and
John Lee for their thoughtful comments on a prior
draft of this article.
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I. Introduction

In addressing the phenomenon of the corporate tax
shelter, those who would curtail the perceived abuses
have tended to proceed from the view that the shelters
were derived from abusive, if not flatly erroneous, appli-
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cations of generally sound rules of law.l Accordingly,
their proposals have adopted overarching but vague
antiabuse principles2 or higher professional standards3 or
enacted highly specific exceptions from the presumably
abused rule for narrowly defined transgressions.4 While
those approaches may be well tailored to some of the
more egregious of the shelters, a significant sector of tax
sheltering behavior, however, is nothing of the sort. For
those shelters, those responses are entirely inadequate.
Not all sheltering devices reflect an abusive interpretation of generally sound tax rules. Rather, some are
based on a logical, if extreme, application of well established rules and principles. Nevertheless, the shelters
achieve results that are wholly unacceptable. One explanation for that seeming inconsistency is that the designers of that set of corporate tax shelters have ferreted out,
and pushed to their logical conclusion, several known,
but long ignored, flaws and discontinuities in the design
of subchapter C.
After 90 years of evolution, there remain fissures of
significant proportions in the fundamental structure of
the Internal Revenue Code. Wholly aside from the need
to stem the revenue loss attributable to corporate tax
sheltering, those flaws in subchapter C are overdue for
correction. In a very real sense, the shelters considered
here can be viewed as having performed the public
service of highlighting the need to return to the unfinished business of drafting the structure of the corporate
tax provisions. This article examines just one category of

lSee, e.g., P. Canellos, "A Tax Practitioner's Perspective on
Substance, Form and Business Purpose in Structuring Business
Transactions and in Tax Shelters," 54 SMU Law Rev. 47, 49
(2001); G. Yin, "Thoughts on Tax Shelters," Tax Notes, Feb. 16,
2004, p. 931 .
2See, e.g. , M. Jackel, "For Better or For Worse: Codification of
Economic Substance," Tax Notes, May 24, 2004, p. 1069, discussing the various legislative proposals. For an excellent and
extended discussion of the use of such broad standards, see
"Symposium on Business Purpose, Economic Substance, and
COI;F.0rate Tax Shelters," 54 SMU Law Rev. 3 (2001).
U.s. Tax Shelter Industry: The Role of Accountants, Lawyers, and Financial Professionals, S. Hrg. 108-473 (2003), Doc
2004-17374,2004 TNT 169-19; See K. Gary and S. Stratton,"Top
Regulators Weigh In on Shelters," Tax Notes, Nov. 24, 2003, p.
947. And see L. Sheppard, "Shelter Penalties: Or Else What?" Tax
Notes, Jan. 12, 2004, p. 188, discussing revisions to Circular 230.
4E.g., sections 358(h) and 1059(e)(1)(A)(iii) and prop. reg.
section 1.752-7.
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tax shelters and the fundamental flaw on which it relied. s
As might be expected of flaws in the code that have
remained uncorrected for nearly a century, the proper
solutions to the perceived flaws in subchapter C are not
always evident or likely to attract unanimous approval.
Nevertheless, revision of the code is essential both to
prevent the sheltering activities and to further the overall
fairness of the corporate tax rules.
II. Exploiting the Conceptual Flaw in Section 351
One of the more commonly used corporate tax shelters
was also, conceptually at least, one of the more simple. By
exploiting one of the most fundamental flaws in the
design of subchapter C, the promoters of the seemingly
infinite varieties of this shelter offered the ability to
reproduce and perhaps accelerate tax losses. As a result,
taxpayers sought to obtain two, if not more, losses for tax
purposes attributable to a single economic loss. While the
mere statement of that desired consequence suggests that
the scheme was improper and the sought after result not
allowable, the reality is far more complex.
A. The Scheme
To see how the scheme was thought to work in its
elementary form before the legislation adopted in October 2004, consider a hypothetical6 corporate taxpayer we
shall call Dolly Inc. Dolly has an asset that has a very high
tax basis but a very low value. We will examine the exact
nature of the asset later; for present purposes, its nature
does not matter and it is easiest to think of the asset as a
rather disappointing investment in bare land. The asset
has a tax basis of $561 million but a value of only $1
million, leaving Dolly with a built-in loss for tax purposes of $560 million. The plan is for Dolly to transfer
that asset to a newly formed subsidiary corporation,
Subdolly, in exchange for the voting stock of the subsidiary, in a transaction that will qualify for nonrecognition
treatment under section 351 of the code. In that event,
under section 358(a) Dolly will obtain a tax basis in the
stock received of the same $561 million although, of
course, the value of the stock would be only $1 million.
Moreover, under section 362(a), Subdolly will acquire a
carryover basis in the transferred asset of the same $561
million.
As can be seen, after the incorporation transfer the
Dolly Group will have two losses for income tax purposes although before the incorporation there was only
one. Eventually Subdolly will sell the asset and claim the
resulting tax loss of $560 million, and at some point Dolly
will dispose of the Sub dolly stock and claim a similar
loss. After that chain of events, the Dolly Group will have
claimed losses for tax purposes totaling about $1.12
billion although it will have sustained an economic loss
of only half that amount.

SA second shelter category worth examining later is the
basis-shifting shelter. Those transactions exploited both glaring
inadequacies in the regulatory scheme and mistakes in the
statutory scheme.
~he hypothetical is loosely based on the reported facts of
Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, No. WDQ-02-2070, Doc
2004-15893,2004 TNT 150-10 (N.D. Md. Aug. 3, 2004).
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Even more troubling, Subdolly might clone the entire
transaction rather than just the loss. If Subdolly retransfers the asset to Secondtierdolly in another section 351
exchange, it would appear to create a third income tax
loss for the Dolly Group - still, of course, attributable to
the single economic loss incurred by Dolly immediately
before setting this series of events in motion. To understand exactly how those rather bizarre results happen
under the income tax rules requires rehearsing some
well-known corporate tax concepts.
B. The Flaw in Section 351
The most fundamental feature of the system used in
the United States for taxing corporations is the application of two, largely distinct levels of taxation on corporate
profits. As is well understood, the operating income of
the corporation is first taxed when it is earned at the
corporate level and at a rate that is comparable to the
rates of tax imposed on individuals. However, when
those earnings are realized by the owners of the business,
either through distributions from the corporation to the
shareholder or through sales of stock by the shareholder,
the resulting income or gain is taxed a second time. The
rate of this second, shareholder-level tax varies with the
manner in which the earnings are realized at the shareholder level and has varied over time.? Still, the
shareholder-level tax is a significant tax burden that
drives a great deal of corporate tax planning. Correspondingly, much of subchapter C exists solely to deter
avoidance of the second tax.
Under our tax laws, the system of double taxation is
unique to corporations and has always been somewhat
controversial. Most other countries have developed integrated systems that avoid or mitigate the double tax,8
and even the United States has recently enacted a material reduction in the rate of the shareholder-level tax .
Nevertheless, the double tax system persists, partly because of revenue needs9 and partly because some regard
the additional tax burden as appropriate in principle,
either as a response to the enhanced economic benefits of
incorporation or because of a perceived reality to the
identity of corporations and their managers apart from
their (separately taxed) owners.lO In any event, under the

7Historically, the shareholder-level tax was imposed at ordinary income tax rates if the earnings were distributed as
dividends but at capital gains rates if they were distributed as
redemptions. Traditionally, dividends were thus taxed at about
twice the rate of redemptions. Today, of course, all distributions
are taxed at the same rate although a recovery of basis is
allowed in the case of redemptions but denied in the case of a
dividend. Section l(h)(ll).
BSee M. Graetz and A. Warren, "Integration of Corporate and
Individual Income Taxes: An Introduction to the Issues," in
Integration of the U.S. Corporate and Individual Income Taxes: The
Treasury Department and American Law Institute Reports (Tax
Analysts, Arlington, Va., 1998).
9See S. Bank, "Corporate Managers, Agency Costs, and the
Rise of Double Taxation," 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 167 (2002).
lOSee R. Goode, The Corporate Income Tax (Wiley, 1951), and R.
Rudnick, "Who Should Pay the Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax
World?" 39 Case West. Res. L. Rev. 965 (1988-89).
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u.s. system, the two-tiered pattern of taxation is applied
only to the earnings of incorporated entities.
A second feature of the system embodied in subchapter C for taxing corporations - not nearly as fundamental as the double tax but a part of the structural foundation of the subchapter nonetheless - is that the mere
incorporation of assets is not the appropriate occasion for
taxing the appreciation, or recognizing the loss, inherent
in those assets. In a broad range of circumstances, incorporating transactions are extended the same nonrecognition treatment that is used elsewhere in the code to
prevent the recognition of income. Accordingly, under
section 351, the gain contained in the incorporated properties is not subject to tax at the time of the transfer
despite that the exchange of properties for stock in the
transferee corporation would otherwise constitute a taxable event. Nonrecognition, however, is only a timing
concept. The gain that escapes tax today is to be taxed in
the future at a more appropriate occasion. The preservation of that gain is accomplished by the making of a
proper adjustment to the basis of whichever property
will preserve the untaxed gain to the appropriate taxpayer.
Nonrecognition operates in several different ways
under the code. For example, on a gift of appreciated
property, the donor is not subject to tax but receives no
property in exchange. In that context, the basis of the
transferred property carries over and becomes the basis
of the transferred property in the hands of the donee. ll
Thus, the gain is preserved to the donee who, for those
purposes, is treated as a continuation of the transferor.
However, in an exchange by two unrelated taxpayers of
"like kind" properties, the transferor is also excused from
a current tax under the nonrecognition provisions of
section 1031. However, in that transaction the transferor
obtains a replacement property of equivalent value in the
exchange. In that context, the basis of the property
transferred away becomes, or in the tax lexicon is substituted for, the basis of the replacement property received
in the exchange. 12 That substitution of basis ensures that
the amount of gain that was not taxed on the exchange
will be taxed in the future and will be taxed to the
transferor. In contrast to the treatment of gifts, under
section 1031, the basis of the transferred property does
not carryover into the hands of the transferee for two
reasons. The transferee is a wholly separate taxpayer
whose gain or loss is determined by factors that pertain
to the transferee and not by factors that pertain to the
transferor. Second, the substitution of the old basis into
the replacement property adequately preserves the gain
that was not taxed at the time of the exchange and it
would not be appropriate to adjust the basis of the
property in the hands of the transferee to create a second
deferred gain.
As can be seen, nonrecognition works in different
ways depending on the nature of the transaction. The old
basis may stay with the property to preserve the amount
of gain in the hands of a different taxpayer or it may shift

llSection 1015.
12Section 1031(d).
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to a new property to preserve the gain to the same
taxpayer. In either context, in a single tax system, nonrecognition works properly and efficiently to defer tax on
the correct amount of gain.
An incorporation transaction can be viewed as combining elements of both gifts and section 1031 exchanges.
The reason that the exchange is granted nonrecognition is
that the transferor is viewed as continuing the ownership
of the transferred properties through a change in the
form of ownership. Accordingly, it is appropriate to treat
the transferee corporation as a continuation of the transferor, much as the donee is treated. However, much like
in a section 1031 exchange, the transferor receives replacement property in the form of stock in the corporation. It would be both feasible and appropriate to adjust
the basis of the stock received to ensure the future
taxation of the transferor.
While either the gift or the section 1031 approach
might appear justified, section 351 and the basis rules
that accompany it treat each of those elements of incorporations as creating two separate nonrecognition transactions. That is, while the transferor's basis in the transferred property carries over to the transferee corporation,
it is also substituted as the basis of the stock received in
the exchange. The effect of all of this, under the double
tax system that applies to corporations, is to create two
separate gains, each of which will become subject to tax,
while before the transaction only a single gain existed.
To illustrate, assume that an unincorporated business
holds properties that have a total value of $561 million
and a tax basis of $1 million. If sold, the owner of the
business would have a taxable gain of $560 million. If,
however, the business were incorporated under the rules
of section 351, the owner would not be subject to any
current gain. Instead, the $1 million basis of the assets
would carryover with the assets to the corporation and
the corporation would face a deferred gain of the same
$560 million. Also, the former owner of the assets now
owns stock in the corporation, and the tax basis of that
stock is also derived from the basis of the nowincorporated assets. Thus, the new shareholder's tax
basis for the stock in the corporation will also be $1
million. As can be seen, where before the incorporation
there was a single gain of $560 million, after the incorporation there are two gains of $560 million inherent in that
business activity. Thus, eventually the corporation will
dispose of the transferred asset, generating a gain of $560
million and the shareholder will dispose of the stock in
the corporation, generating a second and similar13 gain.
What is remarkable about the illustrated consequence
of section 351 is not that the income generated by the
incorporated assets will become subject to two levels of
taxation, for that is the natural and correct consequence
of the double tax system. The remarkable feature of this
routine application of section 351 is that the consequence
of incorporation is applied retroactively. That retroactive

lYrhe gain on the sale of the stock should be reduced by the
amount of taxes paid by the corporation on the corporate-level
gain since that payment would reduce the net worth of the
corporation.
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application of the double tax is plainly wrong. The $560
million gain now inherent in both the corporate assets
and the owner's stock arose before incorporation and
before the taxpayer was subject to the double tax system.
While the application of the double tax system to income
arising from incorporated assets is an accepted, if not
entirely defensible, aspect of our tax system, there is no
justification for the retroactive application of the double
tax to income economically accruing before incorporation. Whatever benefits of incorporation can be said to
justify the extra burden of the double tax 14 plainly do not
apply to income earned before incorporation.
Nor can it be said that retroactive double taxation is an
appropriate price for nonrecognition under section 35l.
Nonrecognition is extended under the code in a wide
range of circumstances, as illustrated above, and in no
other context is a comparable penalty imposed.1 5 Because
that manifestly improper retroactive application of the
double tax flows from the mandatory application of the
basis rules that accompany section 351, the conclusion is
inescapable that those rules, embodied in sections 358
and 362, are flawed.
The obvious imperfection in interaction between the
double tax system and nonrecognition under section 351
was not a matter of particular concern to either taxpayers
or the IRS until recently. One reason for that perhaps
surprising passivity is that during the years preceding
1986 the double tax system was not necessarily a burden
on taxpayers. Before that year a combination of tax
systems features tended to produce an overall tax burden
on corporations, particularly small corporations, that in
many instances was actually lower than the tax burden
imposed on unincorporated enterprises despite the formal imposition of two levels of tax. 16 In that environment, the retroactive application of the double tax was
not necessarily burdensome and may have been of benefit to taxpayers. Under current law, however, the double
tax system is almost always a burden on the taxpayer.
Except for the smallest of corporations,17 the corporate
level tax is comparable to the total tax imposed on
unincorporated business. As a result, the shareholderlevel tax, regardless of how reduced by current law,
produces a burden not born by noncorporate taxpayers.
Accordingly, the retroactive application of the double tax
now will commonly produce a significant unwarranted
burden.

14See J. Kwall, "The Uncertain Case Against the Double
Taxation of Corporate Income," 68 N.C. L. Rev. 613 (1990), and
see supra note 7.
15In addition to gifts and section 1031 exchanges, nonrecognition applies to such diverse transactions as lease terminations
(section 109), cancellation of indebtedness (section 108), condemnations (section 1033), and reorganization exchanges (sections 354 and 361).
16See A. Warren, "The Relation and Integration of Individual
and Corporate Income Taxes," 94 Harv. L. Rev. 719 (1981), and J.
Lee, "A Populist Political Perspective of the Business Tax
Universe," 78 Texas L. Rev. 885 (2000).
17The progressive rate structure of section 11 continues to
provide opportunities to shelter small amounts of income from
the higher tax rates applicable to individuals.
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The retroactive application of the double tax resulting
from a section 351 exchange appears to first have become
a concern to the IRS when taxpayers discovered how to
systematically turn the flaw in the operation of the
nonrecognition rules to their advantage. The opposite of
a $560 million gain, of course, is a $560 million loss, and
while gains are a burden to taxpayers from the tax
perspective, losses are a benefit. Taxpayers learned that
they could tum that flaw in subchapter C to their
advantage by transferring high-basis/low-value property, that is, property containing a built-in loss, to a
corporation in a section 351 transaction. And that, of
course, is exactly what our hypothetical Dolly Inc. did.
Dolly's transaction obviously cannot be allowed.
Dolly has discovered a technique for obtaining losses for
income tax purposes that are many times the economic
loss incurred. The replicated losses do not reflect an
economic loss and cannot be allowed without undermining the integrity of the computation of taxable income.
Nevertheless, the cloning of losses engaged in by Dolly,
while perhaps surprising in result, is nothing more than
a routine application of the flawed basis rules that have
been a part of subchapter C throughout its history. While
most taxpayers engaging in a section 351 exchange are
deferring a gain and thus are prejudiced by the retroactive double tax, Dolly is deferring a loss and is therefore
benefited by the retroactive duplicated loss. Nevertheless, both Dolly's dual loss and the dual gain imposed on
others flow from the same rules and reflect the same
technical flaw.
Because of the potential seriousness of the replication
of losses to the integrity of the corporate income tax, the
tax shelter required a response from the Treasury Department. In seeking to attack this transaction, however, the
focus of Treasury was the duplicated loss and thus the
remedy sought was the elimination of the duplication. 18
That response is inadequate. The fundamental impropriety in Dolly Inc.'s transaction does not tum on the
existence of a loss but turns on the existence of a
duplication - whether of a loss or a gain. It is just as
inappropriate to tax a gain that does not reflect an
economic gain as it is to allow a loss for tax purposes that
does not reflect an economic loss. The statutory flaw that
is in need of correction is in the routine operation of the
basis rules that accompany section 351 and in the way in
which those rules interact with the double tax system.
It would be wrong to eliminate the admittedly erroneous duplicated loss, which benefits taxpayers, without
simultaneously eliminating the erroneous duplicated
gain, which prejudices taxpayers. Indeed, over the nearly
100 years in which the rules have operated, it is more
than likely that the amount of duplicated gains created
by the basis rules have exceeded the amount of duplicated losses. From that perspective it would seem more
urgent to eliminate the double taxation of gains than to
address the double creation of losses. Indeed, it would
seem inappropriate for Treasury to correct the flaw in the
basis rules only when the duplication is prejudicial to the

18Notice 2002-18, 2002-1 C.B. 644, Doc 2002-5894, 2002 TNT
46-14. See also section 358(h), discussed below.
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government. Such "heads we win, tails you lose" rules
are facially unfair and tend to undermine taxpayer confidence in the tax system. A proper solution to the abuses
created by the loss-cloning tax shelter would be to
address the underlying flaw in the section 351 basis rules
by eliminating the retroactive application of the double
tax system regardless of whether those rules duplicated
gains or losses.
It might be argued that eliminating the duplicated loss
without eliminating the duplicated gain would be appropriate by analogy to other provisions of the code that
appear to do precisely that. Indeed, some provisions in
the code do limit the claiming of losses in circumstances
in which gains would be taxed, generally because of
doubt concerning the substance of the claimed loss. Loss
disallowance occurs, for example, when property is sold
to a related taxpayer 19 or when property substantially
identical to the property sold is promptly repurchased. 20
Those transactions amount to a technical realization of
gain or loss21 and ought to be treated as taxable events
unless some strong principle of income tax policy overrides that result. On the gain side, no principle of income
tax policy is offended by imposing a tax on gain when a
taxpayer chooses to accelerate when an unrealized gain
becomes subject to tax by engaging in a sale. Therefore,
taxation of the gain remains appropriate. However, on
the loss side, it would be appropriate for Congress to
conclude, as it did, that sound income tax policy would
be offended by allowing taxpayers to obtain the benefit of
a technical loss that was not, in economic substance,
sustained either because the property was retained
within the taxpayer's economic group or was promptly
replaced by identical property. Thus, disallowance or
deferral of the loss becomes appropriate.
Those rules, however, do not justify eliminating the
replicated loss while perpetuating the replicated gain.
The fundamental flaw in the section 351 basis rules is not
derived from a perceived artificiality in the realization of
the loss claimed but rather lies in the inappropriateness
of applying those basis rules in a manner that creates a
retroactive double tax. That is, the duplicate gain is as
improper as the duplicated loss. The retroactive effect of
the basis rules offends principles of sound income tax
policy regardless of whether the income tax consequence
is a gain or a loss.

III. Creating Built-In Losses
The basis rules that accompany section 351 would
never have formed the basis for a corporate tax shelter if
taxpayers had not discovered how to manufacture property that has a high tax basis but a low value and thus
contains a built-in income tax loss. The clearest example
of such an asset would be an item of property that has a
high undepreciated original cost basis but a low present
value, such as land. However, it is difficult to acquire
such an item of property without also incurring an

19Section 267(a)(1).
20Section 1091 .
21See Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554 (1991).

TAX NOTES, November 8, 2004

economic loss.22 Another approach to creating highbasis/low-value property is to acquire property subject
to an indebtedness that reduces the net value of the
property. Thus, for example, in our original example
involving Dolly Inc.'s formation of a subSidiary, Dolly
might have transferred to the subsidiary cash in the
amount of $561 million while causing the subsidiary to
assume an obligation of Dolly's to pay contingent future
healthcare claims of Dolly's employees (or to restore land
that had been strip mined under environment remediation legislation, and so forth) .
The transfer of that property subject to routine acquisition indebtedness does not produce the tax consequence that Dolly desires. The assumption of a liability of
the transferor by the corporation constitutes an economic
benefit to the transferor in that amount. Accordingly,
under the normal basis rules of section 351, the assumption is treated as a distribution of money and the basis for
the stock received is reduced by the amount of that
constructive distribution, thus eliminating any possibility
of loss to the transferor / shareholder.23 Similarly, the
actual payment of the acquisition indebtedness by the
corporation would not be deductible.
Both of these infirmities, however, will be overcome if
the liability assumed is one for which the payment will
be deductible. In that event, the liability embodies a
future income tax loss that may be used by taxpayers like
Dolly in a loss replication scheme. To illustrate, assume
that a corporate taxpayer owns land on which mining has
occurred as a result of which the taxpayer is under a fixed
legal obligation to partially restore the land to its premining state. That obligation creates a financial liability for
the corporation but one that is not currently deductible,
even by an accrual method taxpayer. 24 The gross value of
the land is $10 million and the predicted future cost of the
environmental remediation is $9 million. If the taxpayer
does not transfer the land, the taxpayer will ultimately
pay the costs of restoring the land, which will leave it
with property worth $1 million and a tax loss of $9
million.
If the taxpayer transfers the land, subject to the
liability, to a newly formed subsidiary in a section 351
exchange, the basis of the stock received will be the $10
million substituted from the transferred land without
reduction attributable to the liability. Because the liability
is one for which the payment has not yet produced a tax
benefit, under section 358(d)(2), its assumption by the
corporation is not treated as a distribution of cash and
does not affect the basis of the stock received. That is the
correct resulP5 On a sale of the stock of the subsidiary,

22Por other approaches, see Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255,
Doc 2000-21236, 2000 TNT 157-7.
23Section 358(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (d)(l).
24Even if a deduction for the liability were otherwise accruable, the deduction would be barred by the economic performance rules of section 461(h) .
2s-rhe matter is a bit more complex. Any assumption of a
liability produces an economic benefit and thus should be
treated by sections 357 and 358 as a distribution of cash which,
if not taxed, should result in a downward basis adjustment.
However, if the liability is deductible, the assumption also
(Footnote continued on next page.)
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the taxpayer would receive net proceeds of $1 million
and would obtain a tax loss of $9 million - exactly the
same result as if the land had not been transferred to the
corporation. However, on the ultimate payment of the
remediation expenses, the subsidiary corporation will
also obtain a tax loss in the amount of $9 million - a
second, duplicated tax loss.26
The result here is not different from the result reached
by Dolly Inc. As has been seen, the normal operation of
the basis rules accompanying section 351 quite inappropriately duplicate both built-in gains and built-in losses.
The fact that the loss is an unmatured business liability
rather than an unrealized loss in property is completely
immaterial. Accordingly, the appropriate legislative response would be the same as the appropriate response to
Dolly's case: the elimination of the duplication. That,
however, is not what occurred.
To understand the inadequacy of what did occur, it is
necessary to review the history of section 358(d). Before
1978 the basis of stock received in a section 351 exchange
was reduced by the amount of all liabilities assumed by
the corporation, whether deductible or not. When the
liability was deductible, but had not yet been deducted,
that produced the wrong result to the transferor. It
overstated the taxable income of the transferor by denying any tax benefit to the transferor attributable to the
loss that the liability reflected.27 That error was corrected
by adding paragraph (2) to section 358(d) to prevent
reducing the basis of the stock received when the liabilities assumed were deductible, thus preserving the basis
to produce a tax benefit in the future .
In 1978 it was thought that the liabilities most affected
by the amendment were the accounts payable of a
cash-method taxpayer. In time, however, the IRS realized
that the same principle applied to all deductible but
undeducted liabilities regardless of the reason for the
lack of deduction. Thus, in 1995 the Service issued Rev.
Rul. 95-7428 holding that section 358(d)(2) applied to the
liability to perform environmental remediation years, if
not decades, in the future. While that ruling was certainly
correct for the same reason that the original 1978 amendment was correct, it created greatly expanded opportunities for tax shelter abuse. The substantial, long-term
liabilities potentially covered by that ruling were far

should result in a tax benefit; if not an immediate deduction,
then an upwards basis adjustment. The net effect of those
theoretical downward and upward adjustments is to leave the
stock basis unaffected by the assumption of the deductible
liability, the result reached by section 358(d)(2).
26See Hempt Bros. Inc. v. United States, 490 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir.
1974). When liabilities are assumed in an isolated transaction,
not a part of the transfer of all of the assets of a business, the
Service may be able to challenge this deduction by the transferee
under the authority of such cases as Holdcroft Transp. Co. v.
Commissioner, 153 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1946), but only if the
transferor is allowed to claim the deduction.
27Coven, "Liabilities in Excess of Basis: Focht, Section
357(c)(3) and the Assignment of Income," 58 Ore. L. Rev. 61
(1979).
28 1995-2 C.B. 36, Doc 95-9854, 95 TNT 212-35. See also FSA
199929015, Doc 1999-24825, 1999 TNT 142-53.
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easier to use in a loss replication scheme than were the
accounts payable of a roofing contractor.
Congress responded to the abuse of Rev. Rul. 95-74 by
eliminating the tax benefit to the transferor from the
liabilities assumed that resulted from the preserved basis
in the stock received in the section 351 exchange. Under
newly added subsection 358(h), if the stock received in a
section 351 exchange contains a built-in loss, that is, has
a tax basis in excess of its fair market value, the basis
must be reduced by the amount of any deductible or Rev.
Rul. 95-74 type liability assumed by the transferee corporation in the exchange (but not below its fair market
value). In other words, in the convoluted style to which
the drafters of tax legislation have become addicted,
Congress in subsection 358(h) partially repealed the basis
preservation rule that it had created in 1978. Since the
1978 amendment and its extension in Rev. Rul. 95-74
were correct, section 358(h) obviously produces an erroneous result.
In fact, section 358(h) has produced a result that is less
rational than the pre-1978 rule. One of the most common
mistakes in drafting corrective tax legislation is to focus
narrowly on the specific result to be altered without
understanding the underlying problem that is producing
the result. In that regard, section 358(h) is a major
offender. Because the section was focused on preventing
an immediate, duplicate loss, it produces results that are
arbitrary, unfair, and irrational. Consider a taxpayer like
Dolly who transferred property having a basis and value
of $10 million subject to a deductible liability of $9
million. After the application of section 358(h), the basis
of the stock in the hands of the transferor will be just $1
million. As required by the subsection, the basis of the
stock has been reduced by the $9 million amount of the
assumed deductible liability to, but not below, its market
value. As a result, Dolly has been denied a tax benefit
attributable to the entire $9 million liability assumed by
the subsidiary.
However, that result changes radically if Dolly also
contributes to the subsidiary'S valuable but low-basis
property. Thus, if Dolly also contributes a tract of unproductive land being held for future use worth $5 million
but having a tax basis of $500,000, the basis of the stock
received, aside from the application of subsection (h),
would be $10 million plus $500,000 reduced by zero
attributable to the deductible liability or $10.5 million.
However, the net value of the stock would be $6 million.
Accordingly, because under section 358(h) the basis of the
stock can only be reduced by the difference between its
basis and value, the stock basis is reduced by $4.5 million
to $6 million. As a result, Dolly would be denied a tax
benefit of only one-half of the amount of the liability
assumed. It would still be entitled to a tax benefit of $4.5
million!
That is the wrong result. If it were improper for the
transferor to retain a basis in the stock received attributable to a deductible liability that has been assumed, then
the basis of the stock should be reduced by the full
amount of the liability to $1.5 million. That approach,
while perhaps unfair (or so it is argued here), would at
least be consistent across transferors of varying mixes of
property. However, there is no rational reason why a
taxpayer should be able to manipulate the extent of

TAX NOTES, November 8, 2004

COMMENTARY I SPECIAL REPORT

entitlement to a tax benefit attributable to a liability
assumed in a section 351 exchange through unrelated
transfers of assets. That is, there is nothing in our
example about the transfer of unproductive land that
should affect Dolly's entitlement to a tax benefit attributable to th~ liability. Dolly's basis should either be $10.5
million or $1.5 million; it should not be something in
between. Focusing on the wrong problem, section 358(h)
produced the wrong answer.
In enacting subsection 358(h) Congress may have
recognized that it was adopting a technically incorrect
rule because it sought to limit the damage it was doing to
the structure of the code by exempting from the repeal
assumptions of liabilities incident to the transfer in a
section 351 exchange of all of the assets of a business. In
retaining the 1978 basis preservation rule for transactions
occurring in the normal course of business but repealing
that rule for isolated transactions, Congress evidently
assumed that transactions undertaken primarily for tax
reduction purposes were isolated and generally could
not involve the transfer of entire businesses. Whether
that is so and whether the IRS can administer the line
drawn by the exception to subsection 358(h) remains to
be seen. What is evident is that section 358(h) has added
a convoluted, difficult-to-enforce, technically incorrect,
and fundamentally unfair rule to the basis computations
following a section 351 exchange in an effort to mitigate
some of the adverse consequences of the retroactive
application of the double tax.
Moreover, section 358(h) does not even address, much
less resolve, the problem of duplicated losses not attributable to deductible liabilities. As seen above, the assumption of deductible liabilities is merely one of the
ways in which the basis rules accompanying section 351
create a duplicate loss. Taxpayers incorporating property
containing other sorts of built-in loss are wholly unaffected by the legislative solution. Plainly, addressing the
fundamental flaw in the section 351 basis rules would
have been a superior approach from every perspective.
IV. Remedying the Defect in the Basis Rules
It is clear enough that the nonrecognition rules accom-

panying section 351 have never been properly integrated
with the double taxation of corporations that the United
States continues to use. As long as that flaw in the basis
rules primarily resulted in a deferred capital gains tax to
the shareholder, the flaw did not appear sufficiently
serious enough to justify the difficult task of synthesizing
those two concepts. However, now that taxpayers have
discovered techniques for exploiting this flaw, it has
become necessary to address the issue. Merely disallowing the duplicated loss, however, along the lines of
section 358(h) is not a sufficient response. Fairness requires that the burden as well as the benefit be eliminated.
The principal design difficulty stems from the fact that
the most obvious technique for avoiding a double tax is
to extend a fair market value basis either to the contributed asset in the hands of the corporation or to the stock
received by the shareholder. However, permitting either
basis adjustment would allow the taxpayer to use the
mechanism of a section 351 exchange to dispose of an
asset without the current recognition of gain. Depending
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on which property basis was increased, either the contributed asset would be sold by the corporation at no
gain or the stock in the corporation would be sold by the
shareholder at no gain. That approach, therefore, would
create a new corporate tax shelter of considerable potency. Rather, to prevent the use of those basis rules to
create improper tax avoidance, neither basis can be
adjusted prior to the time that the built-in gain or loss has
been subject to tax - as under current law.
Given the need to defer any basis adjustment, the
double tax that is imposed by current law can be avoided
only by allowing a single recognition of gain to result in
a dual basis adjustment - once at the corporate level and
once at the shareholder level. While that approach would
somewhat increase the burden of compliance on taxpayers, the greater evil of retroactive double taxation cannot
be avoided in any other way short of the complete repeal
of section 351. Fortunately, dual-level basis adjustments
are a common feature of the taxation of other business
entities and thus do not create unfamiliar or particularly
difficult tax issues.
Double taxation of business profits is avoided in
passthrough entities, including partnerships and S corporations, by the making of dual basis adjustments. The
receipt and reinvestment of the proceeds of dispositions
of assets at the entity level result in the same adjustments
to the basis of the assets of the partnership or S corporation as they do to the assets of any other taxpayer. In
addition, however, the income and loss realized at the
entity level result in an increase or decrease in the basis of
the partnership interest or S corporation stock held by the
owner of the entity.29 That adjustment prevents a second
tax to the owners of the entity when the business
earnings are distributed to the partners or shareholders.
Similarly, when a partnership interest30 is sold, the
basis of the partnership assets is increased or decreased
to reflect the gain or loss on the sale.31 In the partnership
context, that adjustment is made to protect the purchasing partner from a tax on the prepurchase appreciation in
partnership assets. Accordingly, the adjustment is elective and applies only to the gain attributable to that
purchasing partner. For the purposes of this proposal, the
adjustment would be to protect the corporation from a
duplicate, corporate level tax and to bar the corporation
from claiming a duplicate, corporate level loss. Thus, the
adjustment would be far simpler than the partnership
adjustment. The basis adjustment should be mandatory,
not elective, and would apply to the corporate assets for
the purposes of the corporate income tax.
The need to avoid the retroactive application of the
double tax presents the same issues as those presented by
partnerships and S corporations and should be addressed
in the same manner. To the extent that gain or loss
recognized at the corporate level is attributable to appreciation or depreciation contained in an asset contributed

29Sections 705(a) and 1376(a).
30No similar adjustment is made in S corporations, an
omission that represents one of the major deficiencies in that
form of doing business.
31Section 734.
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to the corporation in a section 351 exchange, the basis of
the stock of the contributing shareholder should be
adjusted to prevent a second tax. 32 Should the shareholder sell stock before the corporation sells the contributed asset, to the extent of the built-in gain or loss, the
basis of the asset in the hands of the corporation should
be adjusted. Indeed, the desirability of applying those
partnership concepts to C corporations has been the
subject of speculation by commentators for many years. 33
In fact, it is not necessary to leave subchapter C to find
a precedent for making dual basis adjustments. Under
the long-proposed regulations to the installment reporting rules, when a debt instrument is received as boot in a
section 351 transaction, gain attributable to the exchange
is reportable under the installment method as modified
by those regulations. 34 Under those rules, the basis of the
property contributed to the corporation is not increased
by the gain, the tax on which is deferred under the
installment method. Similarly, the transferor's basis in the
debt instrument received in exchange for the property is
not increased by the amount of the deferred gain. However, when payments of principal are made on the debt
instrument, gain will be recognized and taxed to the
transferor and the basis of the debt will be adjusted
accordingly. Simultaneously, the basis of the contributed
property will also be increased by the amount of that
gain. 35
That treatment of debt received in a section 351
exchange as prescribed by the regulations parallels the
treatment of stock proposed here quite closely. The gain
addressed in the installment sale regulations is gain
arising before incorporation. Under the installment sale
rules, the tax on that gain is deferred to a later time and,
accordingly, the basis adjustment attributable to that gain
is similarly deferred. However, at that later time, the
corporation is subject to double taxation and a dual basis
has been created: the corporation's basis for its assets and
the transferor debtholder's basis for the debt. To prevent
the retroactive application of that double tax to the gain,
as the gain is incurred - here at the debtholder level a dual basis adjustment is made. The same adjustment
for the same reason should be made for all precontribution gain or loss.

32Because income taxes are paid by the corporation, the basis
adjustment to the shareholder should be equal only to the gain
recognized less the income tax paid on that gain. A similar rule
is applied to S corporation stock to the extent that S corporations
are subject to tax on built-in gains. See sections 1367(a)(2)(D) and
1374. Correspondingly, when a built-in loss is recognized, the
basis reduction should equal the amount of the loss less the
amount of the tax saved or refunded.
33S. Thompson, "Tax Policy Implications of Contributions of
Appreciated and Depreciated Property to Partnerships, Subchapter C Corporations and Subchapter S Corporations in
Exchange for Ownership Interests," 31 Tax L. Rev. 29, 85 (1975).
34prop. reg. section 1.453-1(f)(3)(ii) and (iii).
35Similarly, to avoid multiple tiers of taxation of the earnings
of corporations within groups of corporations filing consolidated income tax returns, the earnings of a subsidiary not only
produce a basis increase to the subsidiary but also result in an
increase in the basis of the stock of the subsidiary to its parent
corporation. Reg. section 1.1502-32(a).
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Because the amount of the dual basis adjustment is
limited to the amount of the built-in gain or loss at the
time the property is contributed to the corporation, the
value of the property on that date must be determined.
Admittedly, any required valuation that is independent
of a market transaction establishing value is a source of
difficulty. Obtaining an accurate valuation can be an
expense. Any valuation obtained would be subjective
and thus subject to error and taxpayer manipulation. On
the other hand, there is ample precedent for requiring the
valuation of property in analogous settings. Moreover,
the requirement would add little to what taxpayers
would otherwise be required to provide.
On the disposition of property that had been transferred to a partnership containing a built-in gain or loss,
the precontribution gain or loss generally must be allocated to the contributing partner36 rather than allocated
under the partnership'S profit- or loss-sharing ratio. That
provision requires that the contributed property be valued as of the date of contribution. The requirement here
would be no different. Similarly, following a subchapter S
election, the amount of gain inherent in the properties of
the corporation remains subject to the corporate-level tax
for a 10-year period. 37 That provision, too, requires the
appraisal of the properties of the corporation at the time
of the election and in the absence of a market transaction.
Therefore, on the transfer of property in connection with
the formation of other forms of business entities, a
valuation of the properties of the entity is already required for income tax purposes. The imposition of a
similar requirement on the formation of C corporations is
thus entirely consistent with other demands from similar
needs.
Except on the formation of a corporation owned by a
single entity or individual, the parties must arrive at a
basis for allocating the ownership of the corporation
among themselves. That basis can only be on a valuation
of not only the properties to be contributed to the
corporation, but also of the services. That is, in the
normal and usual course of events and aside from any
requirements of the tax law, the parties generally will
require a valuation of the properties to be contributed to
the corporation that is accurate enough to satisfy their
financial needs. In that commonplace circumstance, the
need for a valuation required by this proposal imposes
little, if any, added burden on the parties.
V. Illustrative Examples
To examine how a dual basis adjustment would work
in the context of a C corporation, assume the transfer of
property in a section 351 exchange that has a value of
$100 and a tax basis of $40. Under the usual basis rules,
both the stock received in the exchange and the property
transferred to the corporation will have a tax basis of the
same $40.
(a) If the stock in the corporation is thereafter sold for
$100, a gain of $60 would result. Under existing law, the
shareholder will obtain a tax basis of $100 in the proceeds

36Section 704(c)(1).
37Section 1374(d)(1).
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received (or in whatever is purchased with those proceeds). Under this proposal, the $60 of gain would
require that the corporation also increase the basis of the
property transferred in the section 351 exchange by $60 to
$100. Accordingly, on a subsequent sale of the property
by the corporation for that amount, no second gain or
loss would be recognized.
(b) If the stock had been sold for $79 because the value
of the stock in the corporation did not fully reflect the
value of the corporate assets,38 the increase in the basis of
the transferred property would be of the $39 gain to $79.
On a subsequent sale of the property by the corporation
for $100, an additional gain of $21 would be recognized.
That is appropriate. The additional gain of $21, having
not been realized at the shareholder level has not been
subject to tax at the shareholder level. Thus, the tax at the
corporate level does not result in retroactive double
taxation. The effect of that rule is to divide the single $60
gain between the shareholder and the corporation.
(c) If the property had been sold at the corporate level,
a gain of $60 would result and a tax would be paid. At a
rate of 35 percent the tax on $60 would be $21. The
corporation therefore will have a basis of $79 in the
after-tax proceeds of sale. Under this proposal, that gain
would also result in an upward adjustment to the basis of
the shareholder's stock in the amount of $39 ($60-$21).
Because the value of the corporation would now be $79
and the basis of the stock would also be $79, the sale of
the stock would not result in any gain or loss and double
taxation would be avoided.
That rule parallels partnership taxation. Under the
partnership rules, the basis increase at the partner level is
allocated solely to the contributing partner39 and a similar rule must be applied here. There would be no
justification for increasing the basis of the stock interests
of other shareholders whose stock basis had not been
determined by that contribution of property. However,
under partnership rules, because partnerships do not pay
income tax, the adjustment to the partnership interest is
equal to the entire amount of the gain - not just the
after-tax amount of gain. The rule proposed here must
differ because the corporate tax is paid at the corporate
level and thus reduces the value of the corporation.
(d) If instead the property had a value of $40 and a tax
basis of $100, analogous results would be obtained. If the
corporation sold the property realizing a loss of $60, it
would obtain a tax savings of $21. Accordingly, the basis
of the corporate assets would be reduced by $60 but
increased by $21 for a net reduction of $39. Correspondingly, the basis of the shareholder's stock would be
reduced by the same $39 to $61, which would equal the
remaining value of the corporation.

38In principle the stock should be valued for less than $100
because the corporate assets are subject to the liability to pay an
income tax on the built-in gain.
3~S occurs because the gain is allocated solely to the
contributing partner under section 704(c). That aspect of partnership tax law is not transferable to C corporations because the
corporate tax is born by the corporation, not its shareholders.
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(e) If the shareholder sold stock for $61, an amount
reflecting the value of the property plus the income tax
refund, a loss of $39 would be incurred and shareholder's
basis in the proceeds would be $61. Under this proposal,
that loss would require a reduction in the basis of the
property in the hands of the corporation by $39 to $61.
On a subsequent sale of the property by the corporation
for its value of $40, a loss of $21 would be incurred.
Under those circumstances, the overall loss on the
property of $60 is divided between the shareholder ($39)
and the corporation ($21). However, no duplication of the
loss occurs.
(f) For tax purposes, depreciation constitutes a tax loss
attributable to the partial disposition of property. That
loss could be a duplicate loss if it were attributable to
property that was contributed to the corporation containing a built-in loss. To prevent the duplication, the basis of
the stock received in exchange for the property must be
reduced to the extent that the corporation claimed depreciation on the portion of the basis attributable to the
built-in loss. The complexity of that approach could be
somewhat mitigated if corporate-level depreciation were
treated as first attributable to the portion of the basis that
did not exceed the value of the property on the date of
contribution.
(g) Returning to Dolly Inc., which in fact contributed
cash subject to the liability to discharge the healthcare
benefits of its employees, the transferor had a basis of
$561 million in stock having a value of only $1 million. If
Dolly sells that stock before the healthcare claims are
paid, it would have accelerated when the tax benefit from
those deductions could be claimed. However, it would
have obtained that tax benefit only at the cost of actually
parting with whatever was left of the $561 million it
contributed to the subsidiary. While that transaction
might be an affront to the accrual method of accounting,
it is not a particularly potent tax shelter. While the
Treasury might wish to prevent that manipulation of the
timing rules of the code, the benefit is distinct from the
loss replication addressed here.
Under this proposal, however, on that sale and the
recognition of the $560 million loss, there should be a
reduction of the basis of the contributed property in that
amount in order to prevent a duplicated loss. However,
Dolly contributed cash that was expended and the basis
of cash cannot be reduced. The functional equivalent of
reducing the basis of property held by Dolly's subsidiary
is to eliminate any other form of tax benefit from the
expenditure of that cash. Accordingly, the loss recognized
by Dolly would result in the elimination of any tax
benefit - that is, deduction - from the expenditure of
the contributed cash by the subsidiary. As a result, the
second (or more) loss sought by Dolly would be eliminated. Indeed, the loss replication tax shelter would be
destroyed.
However, if Dolly did not sell the stock of the subsidiary and the subsidiary did in fact discharge the assumed
liabilities, the subsidiary would be entitled to deduct the
expenditure as under current law. However, the basis of
the stock in the subsidiary held by Dolly would be
reduced by the amount of the after-tax loss.
(h) Consider the consequences of incorporating a
cash-method service business under current law. The
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hypothetical sole proprietorship has cash of $20, accounts
receivable not reflected in income of $35, and accounts
payable of $30. If it does not incorporate, it will have net
income of $5, a tax (at 35 percent) of $1.75 and a net worth
of $23.25. If it incorporates, the shareholder will obtain
stock having a basis of $20 and the corporation will have
a basis in its assets of $20. On the collection of the
receivables and the payment of the payables, the corporation will have net income of $5, a tax of $1.75 and a net
worth of $23.25. If the shareholder then sells stock for its
net value of $23.25, there will be a gain of $3.25. What
that demonstrates, again, is the improper retroactive
imposition of the corporate double tax on income that
was earned and liabilities that were incurred before
incorporation. Under the proposal here, the gain and loss
incurred at the corporate level would result in a net basis
adjustment to the shareholder of $5 less $1.75, or $3.25.

As a result, there would be no gain on the sale of the
stock and no retroactive double taxation.
VI. Conclusion

When the income tax laws seem to be producing the
wrong answer, there has been a tendency, perhaps understandable, to view the result as a narrow, technical
glitch requiring a narrow and technical response. Too
often those easy fixes both complicate the law and detract
from its structural integrity. Sometimes they miss the real
problem entirely. The loss-replicating tax shelter is one
such instance. The need to address the tax avoidance
potential of that category of tax shelters provides an
opportunity to redress one of the lingering structural
flaws in subchapter C. That opportunity should be embraced, not avoided.

Addendum
Under section 362(e)(2), newly added by the American
Jobs Creation Act of 2004, p.L. 108-357, the retroactive
duplicate loss created by the section 351 basis rules is
eliminated for all transfers of property governed by
section 351. That extension will help eliminate the uneven effects of section 358(h), which applied only to a
limited category of built-in loss. However, like the flawed
approach of section 358(h), the new provision does
nothing to eliminate the double taxation of built-in gains
and thus merely extends the unfairness of current law.
The approach taken in the new provision to eliminate
the duplicate loss is different from that suggested above
and could not be extended to built-in gains. Under
section 362(e)(2), the duplication can be eliminated at
either the corporate or the shareholder level, at the
election of the parties. Thus, under the default rule, the
aggregate bases of property received by the transferee
corporation in the section 351 exchange cannot exceed
the aggregate fair market value of those properties.
However, at the election of both the transferor and the
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transferee, that corporate-level limitation will not apply,
and instead the basis of the stock received by the transferor is reduced to its fair market value.
It is not clear that the elective elimination of loss will
be effective to prevent the tax shelter abuses of concern to
Congress because taxpayers will naturally preserve the
loss for the taxpayer who will most benefit from its
realization. However, the approach cannot be extended
to the elimination of duplicate gains for the reasons
discussed above: The taxpayer would use the election to
eliminate gain for the taxpayer planning a taxable disposition.

While the new provision should perhaps be welcomed
as a step toward the integration of the double corporate
tax with the basis rules of section 351, it does not
constitute a comprehensive approach to, or the elimination of, that problem. Moreover, it must be criticized as a
continuation of the unfairly one-sided approach begun in
section 358(h).
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